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Abstract  
 
Recently, the container shipping industry has been witnessing a wave of new mergers and reshuffling of cooperation 
agreements (alliances) which have heavily affected the market. This development has also taken place among vertically 
integrated carriers, thus affecting not just the shipping side of the business but the different supply chains as well. By using 
non-cooperative merger control games, featuring carriers involved in strategic alliances and competition authorities, this paper 
analyses the impact of the vertical integration of carriers and terminal operators on the stability of alliances. Starting from a 
benchmark set-up where carriers and stevedores are separated, we first find that when the integration concerns merging 
carriers only, alliance stability is undermined because non-merging allied carriers are more likely to register losses due to 
market share reductions and possibly higher terminal tariffs. However, by assuming that alliance agreements are extended to 
terminal operations, for all the allied partners, we show that alliances might be more stable since non-merging carriers are 
vertically integrated as well, and can internalize terminal charges. Given the on-going trends of consolidations in container 
shipping, this last hypothesis implies that merger waves might still occur without the breaking down of alliances, as long as 
landside cooperation among allied carriers, along the supply chain, is also considered. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Since the ‘90s, ocean carriers have largely resorted to strategic alliances to exploit global demand opportunities 
and achieve joint efficiencies at sea (Notteboom et al., 2017; Caschili et al., 2014; Slack et al., 2002). Quartieri (2017) 
pointed out that “the formation and enlargement of these consortia do not alter the average variable cost of a carrier 
but spread it over all the members yielding a decrease in each carrier's marginal cost”, ultimately positively impacting 
on the possibility to compete in the market. Thus, this form of horizontal cooperation entails benefits in terms of 
cost savings and wider network organization, but implies challenges as well. Mainly designed to take advantage of 
vessel sharing arrangements, strategic alliances do not include price fixing, joint sales or sharing of profits 
(Panayides and Wiedmer, 2011). Therefore, the stability of alliances relies upon an efficient design of agreements 
that motivate carriers to cooperate (Song and Panayides, 2002; Midoro and Pitto, 2000). 
 
From the carriers’ perspective, on the one hand, allied partners maximize own profits and impose rather strict 
agreements among themselves to rationalize vessel sharing and organize port calls (Bergantino and Veenstra, 2002; 
Notteboom and Winkelmans, 2001; Heaver et al., 2000). On the other hand, liner networks can be successful only 
if economies of scale achieved at sea are not negated by diseconomies of scale in ports, as lucidly shown in 
Haralambides (2019) (see also OECD, 2015; Benacchio et al., 2007; Wilmsmeier et al., 2006). As a result, since the 
late ‘90s, vertical agreements involving carriers and terminal operators started to be signed, to better compete 
with other allied and not-allied carriers (Parola et al., 2015; A lvarez-SanJaime et al. 2013; Ferrari et al., 2008; 
Notteboom, 2004). Moreover, the emergence of dedicated container terminals has allowed allied carriers to 
internalize negative externalities due to double marginalisation (Van de Voorde and Vanelslander, 2009; 
Haralambides et al., 2002).  
 
Undoubtedly, the industry setting has been strongly affected by both the consequences of post-crisis demand 
shocks and the persistent over-supply of carrying capacity shown in recent years.  
 
 
1.1  Consequences of M&As 
Another interesting element is related to the influence of competition authorities on shipping strategy. Thus, it is 
possible to highlight the link between mergers and alliances also from a normative perspective. Specifically, 
alliance (in)stability could improve by industry-specific features (e.g. overcapacity, cascading effetcs) shown by 
main merger control reviews. 
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From a normative point of view, recent merger cases reviewed by the Competition Directorate of the European 
Commission (from now on, CD) suggest that the occurrence of mergers among carriers belonging to different 
alliances could result in market outcomes which are detrimental to consumer welfare (EU Commission, 2004, 
section IV, art. 39 and ss.). Beyond potential efficiency gains obtained by integrating assets, horizontal mergers 
reduce the number of competitors and favor the collective decision-making by carriers. Since these features tend 
to raise post-merger freight rates, consolidation is considered as anticompetitive, whenever merger-specific 
efficiencies are not large enough to offset upward prices. Following current EU and US merger policy, however, 
merger proposals are subjected to structural remedies (e.g., assets divestiture) to make projects compatible with 
competition policy goals whenever prospective efficiencies are relatively low (EU Commission, 2008; FTC, 2012). 
Whereas in other transportation sectors (e.g., airline industry) merger proposals are cleared conditional to the 
reallocation of assets, such as plants, brands, capacity, etc., strategic alliances in container shipping have 
necessitated a different approach. Specifically, as the anticompetitive effects of inter-alliance mergers are very 
likely to spread over all the involved alliances, and to further reduce competition, in recent merger cases the EU 
CD revealed a clear-cut approach: merger proposals are approved subject to conditions in the form of the 
withdrawal of one merging party from own consortium or alliance (see, among others, EU Commission decisions 
in 2016, Case CMA CGM/NOL - M.7908 and 2017, Case Maersk/ Hamburg Su d – M. 8330). .  
 
Aiming at avoiding links between previously unconnected carriers that are likely to increase freight rates, however, 
we argue that the above merger control policy may have contributed to a most noticeable shake up of existing 
alliances for the following reason. Whenever acquiring carriers undertake mergers with target assets from other 
alliances, the latter alliances may end up lacking the capacity that would allow them to effectively compete, thus 
causing further alliance reshuffling (Notteboom, 2016). To briefly illustrate this point: Following CMA CGM’s 
proposal to takeover Neptune Orient Lines (NOL), the merger was cleared (April 2016) by the EU CD subject to 
commitments resulting in the exit of NOL from the G6 Alliance (European Commission, 2016 – Case M.7908). 
Overall, this decision weakened G6, reducing its deployed capacity from 3,520 to 3,100 million TEUs. This 
influenced Hapag-Lloyd’s (also in G6) competitive behavior, who shortly thereafter submitted a merger proposal 
with UASC (O3), approved in November 2016 subject to the withdrawal of UASC from the NEU1/O3 (Ex-Pendulum) 
consortium (EU Commission, 2016 – Case M.8120). Soon after, Maersk (2M alliance with MSC) decided to acquire 
Hamburg Su d; the merger was cleared in April 2017 conditional upon the exit of the target from five consortia (EU 
Commission, 2017 – Case M.8330). The bankruptcy of Hanjin, in the late summer of 2016, further enticed such 
agreements, all making container shipping even more concentrated. In addition, the three Japanese shipping 
‘giants’, NYK, MOL and K Line, concluded a joint venture (called ONE, Ocean Network Express), approved by the EU 
CD in June 2017 (EU Commission, 2017 – Case M.8472), after rejection by other regulators (U.S. Federal Maritime 
Commission; South Africa’s CompCom SA). Lastly, in December 2017, the approved takeover of Hong Kong’s OOCL 
by Cosco reduced the number of the newly-born Ocean Alliance members (EU Commission, 2017 – Case M.8594). 
In all such cases, a rather clear pattern emerged: target companies left their own alliance and/or consortia.  This 
probably increased the incentive of remaining carriers to seek new alliances or merging partners. As a result of 
this wave of mergers, the past four alliances were reduced to three (OCEAN, THE, 2M), encompassing mostly the 
same main players. Concentration on East-West trade routes increased further as a result. 
 
In times of consolidation that are not bound to fade, how could we foresee the impact of potential waves of inter-
alliance mergers on existing alliances? Under the main hypothesis that strategic alliances may be affected by the 
merger control review of previous consolidations, the aim of our paper is to analyze the conditions under which 
vessel sharing agreements are likely to survive after sequential mergers. In some cases, approved inter-alliance 
mergers are more likely to induce individual carriers to exit the alliance, providing these companies with larger 
incentives to seek further consolidation in the short run. As a result, decisions made by competition authorities 
could favor alliance reshuffling. To take into account different scenarios in the current container shipping industry, 
our analysis will cover cases where: (i) acquiring carriers and terminal operators are not integrated (vertical 
separation); (ii) acquiring carriers and terminal operators are vertically integrated but allied partners have to pay 
charges for terminal services (partial vertical integration); and, finally, (iii) acquiring carriers and terminal 
operators are vertically integrated and also allied partners benefit from terminal operations without paying any 
charges (full vertical integration).  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a literature review is presented to describe the adopted game-
theoretical methodology. In Section 3, we describe the model set-up in which carriers – that compete among each 
other in terms of quantity of TEUs shipped and have the possibility to join strategic alliances - enter a sequential 
merger formation game, where a consumer-oriented CD is called to review merger proposals. Assumptions about 
the vertical integration of carriers and terminal operators give different results discussed in Section 4. Section 5 
discusses the results of the analysis and Section 6 concludes the paper, providing industry-related implications. 
 
2.  Literature review 
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Selected studies about the evolution of strategic alliances from the ‘90s onwards have been carried out, offering us 
different perspectives on the features and drivers of their formation. As regards horizontal cooperation, Ryoo and 
Thanopoulou (1999) studied the progression of agreements in Asian markets from consortia to alliances, starting 
from the late ‘90s, and noticed how the global nature of alliances, along with a certain flexibility in alliance 
agreements, offered incentives for their formation, aiming at achieving economies of scale at sea. This result was 
also empirically stated by Evangelista and Morvillo (2000) who surveyed 341 alliances from 1990 to 1998, finding 
that most of them (86%) were active in the sea leg of the supply chain, rather than in inland logistics services. In 
terms of market-oriented drivers, Slack et al. (2002) supported the claim that – at least in the early stages – 
alliances might lead to higher service frequency and the possibility for alliance members to cover a higher number 
of ports. This strategic advantage changed over the years, with alliances often used as a means to rationalize the 
supplied capacity and the scheduling of services rather than for expanding the offer of shipping services. 
Concerning this latter issue, Panayides and Wiedmer (2011) studied the evolution of alliances by comparing their 
operational performance in several geographical areas and diversified carriers’ specific elements (e.g. capacity, 
routing, vessels). Their work confirmed that container shipping was indeed affected by alliances in the early stages 
of the recent economic downturn, from (late) 2008 to 2010, especially in terms of market-coverage, i.e. of carriers 
withdrawing tonnage so as to reduce costs and service characteristics. From the end of 2008, most of the 
abovementioned adjustments pushed alliances to modify the service structure, as a huge amount of capacity was 
shifted from services between Europe and Asia to emerging markets.  
 
Relatively scarce attention has been given to the relationship between alliances and mergers in container shipping. 
From an empirical perspective, Alix et al. (1999) have shown how capacity can be expanded very quickly through 
merger actions and this strategy could be quite effective to react to demand shocks, promoting mergers with rivals 
coming from other alliances. In a similar fashion, Das (2011) found that when the intensity of competition among 
carriers increases, mostly during market recessions, they are more likely to opt for mergers rather than alliances, 
suggesting that consolidations could be considered as a step forward of alliances in terms of market control. 
 
Regarding to the emergence of vertical cooperation in door-to-door services along the supply chain, various 
authors have discussed the different levels of integration of carriers with key ports and local or global terminal 
operators, so as to achieve cost savings and efficient handling at container terminals. This literature has shown 
that carriers have become similar in terms of service routes and ship sizes, but also in strategic behavior, including 
efforts to vertical integration with terminal operators. Ferrari et al. (2008) showed that servicing home markets 
affects mega-vessel deployments in specific trade lanes, with increasing vertical links between terminal operators 
both in Europe and Asia (Cariou, 2008). More recently, Parola et al. (2014) analyzed the carriers’ involvement in 
terminal operations through a variety of investments starting from 2010, identifying alliances, among other types 
of hidden families, behind the choice of ports of call. As generalized by Notteboom et al. (2017), this result also tells 
us something about the relevant role of alliances as oligopolistic players in modern container shipping. 
Increasingly acting as single entities, alliances may have an impact on market conditions (i.e., freight rates, port 
calls, handling charges), even when the carriers are not vertically integration. 
 
From a methodological perspective, the analysis of strategic alliances in container shipping draws widely from 
game theory. Indeed, alliance members can be considered as players using binding agreements to optimize 
collective payoffs. As cooperative games are suitable to model slot exchanges and vessel sharing (cf. Yang et al., 
2011; Agarwal and Ergun, 2010; Ding and Liang, 2005), Shi and Voss (2011) provided a survey revealing 
researchers’ strong inclination towards this type of games, in an effort to study the conditions under which 
alliances might be reshaped. Turning to non-cooperative games used to model oligopolistic shipping markets 
(Álvarez-SanJaime et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2012; Boile et al., 2012), liner companies are typically assumed to 
compete on the quantity of supplied slots, either with allied or not-allied similar firms, to maximize individual 
profit. In these cases, Cournot-Nash equilibria are derived, where capacity and marginal costs at sea are variables 
determining market outcomes (Aymelek et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2014). In spite of its attempt to model competition 
in container shipping, however, this literature has so far neglected the analysis of horizontal mergers, as a primary 
way to cut costs and exert market power. More importantly, the emergence of carrier consolidation has not yet 
been investigated, to understand the interplay between existing alliances and post-merger market outcomes. Thus, 
should carriers belonging to an alliance pursue merger projects with other alliance members in sequential rounds? 
Under what conditions merger waves could be sustained in the short run without inducing alliance reshuffling or 
breakdown? What is the role of merger control rules of competition authorities (i.e., withdrawal of target carriers 
from own alliances) on existing alliances? And, finally, whenever carriers are directly involved in terminal 
operations, how could we incorporate landside operators in the analysis?  
 
In order to investigate this interplay between horizontal mergers and strategic alliances in the container shipping, 
we apply a game-theoretical framework which includes players who have the opportunity to submit merger 
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proposals in multiple rounds, that is, allowing for the concentration of different companies over time. In Cournot 
settings, this assumption implies that the carrying capacity supplied by players might be rationalized, with the 
possibility to generate market distortions (e.g. price control, anti-competitive effects). Therefore, whenever 
mergers occur sequentially, they would represent a so-called merger wave, with potential strong impacts on the 
market structure. Evidently, this approach properly fits the recent (and not fading) wave of consolidations in 
container shipping, where carriers belonging to different alliances merged in response to previous takeovers (e.g., 
in late 2016, the merger between Hapag-Lloyd and UASC clearly came after the takeover of NOL by CMA CGM). But 
how the welfare effects of horizontal mergers in the container shipping and the related behavior of competition 
authorities could be studied according to this literature? Early works assumed mergers as exogenous (or partially 
endogenous) and welfare outcomes were discussed by simply comparing pre- and post-merger quantities/prices. 
Gowrisankaran (1999) studied mergers occurring sequentially, but his analysis ruled out strategic interaction 
between mergers. Faulì -Oller (2000) provided a game-theoretical framework but his merger games were not 
completely endogenous. Finally, in Horn and Persson (2001), the merger process is treated as a (static) cooperative 
game of coalition formation, where the players are free to communicate and write binding agreements. From a 
normative perspective, in fact, a more ‘dynamic’ analysis of market outcomes, resulting after possible merger 
waves (especially in terms of effects on consumer welfare), strongly depends on how mergers interact with each 
other but also on what variables may stimulate sequential consolidations. According to a more recent literature on 
the normative outcomes of merger control reviews in Cournot markets, we here argue that merger waves are likely 
to occur due to either large prospective efficiencies (by integrating assets) or market conditions. In the first case, 
efficiency gains allow merging carriers belonging to different alliances to further rationalize costs, increase their 
supply and thus reduce post-merger freight rates (assuming that markets are sufficiently competitive). Clearly, this 
effect might make a merger proposal more likely to be approved by competition authorities, as 
consumers/shippers are expected to be better off. In the second case (market conditions) and in the presence of 
tonnage overcapacity, merging parties could benefit from rationalizing their supply: a more balanced supply can 
imply lower marginal costs and can impact on marginal revenues as well. Still, post-merger rates tend to be lower 
and consolidations are more likely to be cleared (Qiu and Zhou, 2007). But is it true that approved mergers would 
favor more mergers among carriers in the short run? By focusing attention on forward-looking, consumer-oriented, 
competition authorities, to assess the emergence of merger waves in Cournot markets Motta and Vasconcelos 
(2005) showed that merger waves could be effectively stimulated by competition authorities. In a later study, 
Vasconcelos (2010) targeted the conditions under which sequential mergers are sustainable. The author 
concluded that, in cases where firms compete on quantity, whenever starting mergers are cleared thanks to large 
cost savings or negative demand conditions (excess capacity), this decision conduces to follow-up consolidations. 
 
Although these results suggest that self-reinforcing merger waves may be sustained also in container shipping, 
nothing is so far said about markets where, before merger rounds occur, firms are already engaged in binding 
agreements. (alliances) In such cases, on the one hand carriers belonging to an alliance have the incentives to 
merge with members of different alliances to further save on costs and cover wider shipping markets but, on the 
other hand, mergers tend to increase within-alliance asymmetries. In other words, merging carriers raise their 
respective capacity above that of individual allied partners, which may as a result suffer from financial and/or 
competitive distress. To account for this feature in container shipping, we attempt to enrich the standard merger 
control modelling by considering two industry-specific aspects. First, following evidence from real-life reviews, we 
allow for a CD imposing the withdrawal of merging carriers from their own alliance. As said above, this approach 
seems different from other similar industries (e.g., airlines) where structural remedies are more in use. Second, 
with the aim to consider the integration of carriers and terminal operators as a thriving trend in the industry, we 
investigate how vertical relationships in container shipping might affect post-wave market structure. 
 
 
3.  A model of merger waves in container shipping 
 
3.1  The basic set-up 
 
Consider a container shipping market where carriers are involved in strategic alliances. We assume two symmetric 
alliances, North and South, composed of three partners each, where i = {1, 2, 3} and j = {4, 5, 6}, respectively. By 
ruling out differences between eastbound and westbound shipping demand, ocean carriers operating on a given 
East-West route with the following inverse linear demand are considered: 
 
𝑓(𝑞𝑖 , 𝑞𝑗) = 𝑉/𝐾 − ∑ 𝑞𝑖
3
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑞𝑗
6
𝑗=4          [1] 
 
Where: f is the freight rate; qi and qj represent the number of TEUs moved by the carriers belonging to the North 
and South Alliance, respectively; K indicates the total carrying capacity (i.e. slots) that carriers deployed during the 
year while V is the demand for shipping services that could be satisfied by the deployed capacity. In case of perfect 
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market competition V would be equal to the sum of qi and qj. In the inverse demand function, the composite 
parameter V/K thus represents the level of industry overcapacity. Given a certain market demand V, if the total 
capacity K is larger than V, the industry overcapacity occurs as well (the ratio shrinks) because the reservation 
price (willingness to pay) of shippers diminishes. Hence, by positing that K is greater than V we assume a chronic 
overcapacity in the container shipping. For simplicity, in our model, individual carriers are endowed with pre-
merger exogenous capacity ki = kj = K/6. However, since what distinguishes carriers is the amount of post-merger 
capacity they end up with, we assume that each carrier operates with marginal costs at sea which are downward 
affected by both individual and alliance-based capacity endowment: 
 
C𝑖(𝑘𝑖 , 𝑡𝑁) = [(
𝐾−𝑘𝑁
𝑘𝑖
) 𝑔 + 𝑡𝑁] 𝑞𝑖          [2] 
 
C𝑗(𝑘𝑗 , 𝑡𝑆) = [(
𝐾−𝑘𝑆
𝑘𝑗
) 𝑔 + 𝑡𝑆] 𝑞𝑗          [3] 
 
where: Ci and Cj are the North and South alliance members’ total cost function, respectively; kN and kS represent 
the overall alliances’ capacity endowment (TEUs); the parameter g measures (exogenous) cargo-related costs at 
sea1; and tN and tS represent the unit terminal handling charges (THCs) paid by the North and South members at 
port.  As the way in which costs are modelled is relevant, some remarks are necessary at this point. Specifically, the 
formulation in [2]-[3] does capture three distinctive features of the container shipping industry. First, our 
assumption of exogenous overall capacity means that whenever  the total capacity of one alliance increases, that 
of the second declines (as in the numerator between round brackets). In other words, the more capacity-wise an 
alliance is, the stronger are its related joint economies of scale with respect to other alliances. Since vessel sharing 
agreements allow alliance members to optimize a larger capacity and reduce operational costs, in the model the 
alliance-based synergies generated by the aggregation of capacity are assumed to combine to g in order to 
determine each carrier’s marginal costs at sea. Second, in cases of horizontal concentrations, merging carriers are 
assumed to achieve merger-specific cost savings by integrating production assets (Motta and Vasconcelos, 2005; 
Perry and Porter, 1985). Since asset-based mergers bring the capacity of involved carriers into a larger liner 
company, further efficiencies arise (as the denominator between round brackets).. However, both merging and 
non-merging carriers’ marginal costs at sea are affected. To illustrate, let us consider the two types of mergers 
pertinent to our analysis. If only one merger is finalized between two carriers (say, 1 and 5), drawn from North and 
South, such a merger would make industry capacity biased towards the alliance that would host the merged 
carriers. Whenever a carrier leaves its alliance to join that of its merging partner (e.g., by merging with 1, carrier 5 
will join the North Alliance), the capacity of the first alliance shrinks (i.e., kS shifts downward to K/3, while kN goes 
up to 2K/3). If, instead, two mergers occur (i.e., after the initial merger, also carriers 4 and 2 react by merging 
together), then the capacity structure of the industry will return to its symmetrical set-up 2 . Third, the last 
component of carriers’ marginal costs is terminal-based (reflecting the vertical link between carriers and terminal 
operators), represented by terminal charges required to handle cargo containers.  
 
3.2.  Pre-merger equilibrium 
 
In terms of shipping network structure, all the North (South) Alliance members are assumed to call at port N (S). 
Typically, the competition between hubs within the same region (e.g., Algeciras competes with Port Said East in 
Southern Europe)registers that individual carriers’ demand for transshipment is rather elastic. Indeed, the related 
alliance-based demand tends to be inelastic as allied carriers consolidate cargoes at the same terminal to exploit 
hub-and-spoke techniques and lower shipping costs (Parola et al., 2014; Wiegmans et al., 2008). For instance, along 
the Europe-Far East route, CKYHE (via Cosco) tranships at Piraeus, whereas 2M (via Maersk) does it at Algeciras. 
 
According to the pre-merger structure described above, at each transshipment hub carriers and terminal operators 
are involved in a non-cooperative two-stage market game. As in the present benchmark setting terminal handling 
charges (THC) are set independently by terminal operators in the first stage of the game, we assume that terminal 
operators set THCs tN and tS to maximize profit.3 In the second stage of the game, given the optimal THCs previously 
established, carriers maximize own profits by choosing the quantity of TEUs to be carried. 
                                                 
1 Including expenses such as stuffing, stripping, measuring, tallying, cargo inspection, custom examination, 
documentation, etc. 
2
 A more general model should also consider cases in which merging carriers are endowed with asymmetrical capacity. 
However, this assumption would complicate the mathematical tractability of the model without changing its outcomes. 
As mergers often occur involving both large companies and major/minor companies, then a ‘defensive’ merger would 
try to obtain a similar aggregate capacity. 
3 For simplicity and without loss of generality, port costs are set to zero. 
6 
 
 
From a game-theory perspective, dealing with non-cooperative sequential games implies that we look for 
symmetric sub-game perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) in pure strategies, in its turn meaning that, at each stage of 
the pre-merger game, carriers and terminal operators simultaneously make decisions to maximize their own 
payoffs (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Before deriving the pre-merger equilibrium in case of vertical separation 
(labelled with s), we make the following assumption to ensure positive TEUs supplied by each carrier. 
 
Assumption. Industry overcapacity is sufficiently small with respect to marginal costs at sea, i.e., V/K > 3g. 
 
By applying the backward induction procedure, we first derive carriers’ decisions about the quantity of TEUs in the 
second stage of the market game. Given the terminal charges tsN and tsS , set by operators in the first stage, the North 
and South Alliance partners choose qsi and qsj, respectively, by solving the following problems: 
 
max
𝑞𝑖
𝑠
{𝜋𝑖
𝑠 = (𝑉/𝐾 − 𝑞𝑖
𝑠 − ∑ 𝑞ℎ
𝑠3
ℎ=𝑖 − ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑠6
𝑗=4 − 3𝑔 − 𝑡𝑁
𝑠 )𝑞𝑖
𝑠}       [4] 
 
max
𝑞𝑗
𝑠
{𝜋𝑗
𝑠 = (𝑉/𝐾 − 𝑞𝑗
𝑠 − ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑠3
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑞𝑙
𝑠6
𝑙=𝑗 − 3𝑔 − 𝑡𝑆
𝑠)𝑞𝑗
𝑠}       [5] 
 
Solving the related second-stage first order conditions (∂πsi/∂qsi = 0 and ∂πsj/∂qsj = 0, for every i and j), the 
individual carriers’ equilibrium TEUs (as function of terminal charges) are derived by: 
 
𝑞1
𝑠(𝑡𝑁
𝑠 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑠) = 𝑞2
𝑠(𝑡𝑁
𝑠 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑠) = 𝑞3
𝑠(𝑡𝑁
𝑠 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑠) =
1
7
(𝑉/𝐾 − 3𝑔 − 4𝑡𝑁
𝑠 + 3𝑡𝑆
𝑠)      [6] 
 
𝑞4
𝑠(𝑡𝑁
𝑠 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑠) = 𝑞5
𝑠(𝑡𝑁
𝑠 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑠) = 𝑞6
𝑠(𝑡𝑁
𝑠 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑠) =
1
7
(𝑉/𝐾 − 3𝑔 − 4𝑡𝑆
𝑠 + 3𝑡𝑁
𝑠 )      [7] 
 
By comparing [6]-[7] and taking carriers 1 and 4 as alliances’ representatives, we note that THCs have a clear-cut 
effect on carriers’ equilibrium decision (in terms of TEUs), as: 
 
𝜕𝑞1
𝑠(𝑡𝑁
𝑠 ,𝑡𝑆
𝑠)/
𝜕𝑡𝑁
𝑠 =
𝜕𝑞4
𝑠(𝑡𝑁
𝑠 ,𝑡𝑆
𝑠)
𝜕𝑡𝑆
𝑠 < 0  
𝜕𝑞1
𝑠(𝑡𝑁
𝑠 ,𝑡𝑆
𝑠)/
𝜕𝑡𝑆
𝑠 =
𝜕𝑞4
𝑠(𝑡𝑁
𝑠 ,𝑡𝑆
𝑠)
𝜕𝑡𝑁
𝑠 > 0       [8] 
 
Whereas increasing tariffs at terminal N (S) will reduce the TEUs supplied by North (South) Alliance’s carriers, in 
turn, the output set by the carriers of the rival alliance increases. This effect suggests that the vertical separation 
of carriers and terminal operators tends to reduce carriers’ supply (i.e., marginal revenues are lower). 
 
Turning to the first stage of the market game, terminal operators at transshipment hubs N and S set tariffs by 
maximizing own profit function as follows: 
 
max
𝑡𝑁
𝑠
{𝜋𝑁
𝑠 = 𝑡𝑁
𝑠 [𝑞1
𝑠(𝑡𝑁
𝑠 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑠) + 𝑞2
𝑠(𝑡𝑁
𝑠 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑠) + 𝑞3
𝑠(𝑡𝑁
𝑠 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑠)]}        [9] 
 
max
𝑡𝑆
𝑠
{𝜋𝑆
𝑠 = 𝑡𝑆
𝑠[𝑞4
𝑠(𝑡𝑁
𝑠 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑠) + 𝑞5
𝑠(𝑡𝑁
𝑠 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑠) + 𝑞6
𝑠(𝑡𝑁
𝑠 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑠)]}        [10] 
 
The first-stage best response functions (∂πsN/∂tsN = 0 and ∂πsS/∂tsS = 0) imply that increasing rival’s terminal 
charges would make own tariffs rise as well: 
 
𝑡𝑁
𝑠 (𝑡𝑆
𝑠) =
1
8
(𝑉/𝐾 − 3𝑔 + 3𝑡𝑆
𝑠)  𝑡𝑆
𝑠(𝑡𝑁
𝑠 ) =
1
8
(𝑉/𝐾 − 3𝑔 + 3𝑡𝑁
𝑠 )     [11] 
 
By solving the system in [11], we get the equilibrium THCs in the pre-merger benchmark scenario: 
 
𝑡𝑁
𝑠 = 𝑡𝑆
𝑠 =
1
5
(4 − 3𝑔)           [12] 
 
Finally, by inserting [12] in [1], [6]-[7] and [11], we can state that: 
 
Proposition 1. (Pre-merger equilibrium with vertical separation). In cases of vertical separation of carriers and 
terminal operators, either the industry overcapacity or marginal costs at sea reduce allied carriers’ supply and profits. 
At equilibrium, the quantity of TEUs by individual carriers; freight rates; and carriers’ profits are derived as follows: 
 
𝑞1
𝑠 = 𝑞2
𝑠 = ... = 𝑞6
𝑠 =
4
35
(𝑉/𝐾 − 3𝑔)         [13] 
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𝑓𝑠 =
1
35
(11𝑉/𝐾 + 72𝑔)           [14] 
 
𝜋1
𝑠 = 𝜋2
𝑠 = ... = 𝜋6
𝑠 =
16
1225
(𝑉/𝐾 − 3𝑔)         [15] 
 
 
3.3  Merger formation game 
 
In this subsection, merger waves among carriers and their relationship with strategic alliances are modelled. The 
sequential non-cooperative merger formation game firstly assumes two rounds of merger proposals (to allow for 
potential merger waves). Secondly, as target carriers involved in a merger proposal typically leave their own 
alliance, in the case of a merger between carriers 1 and 5, the latter would join the North Alliance, whereas in the 
case of a merger between carriers 4 and 2, the South Alliance would eventually include carrier 2. Finally, only 
merger proposals preserving current alliances are assumed feasible. There are two reasons for this hypothesis. 
First, it would be easier to compare conditions under which single mergers or merger waves could occur. Then, in 
this way, we can assess the alliance stability by contrasting post-merger market structures, where alliances can be 
reshaped (but not break down) due to individual carriers exiting the market. 
 
 
Table 1 
Mergers among allied carriers and post-merger structures 
 
Type of merger Label Market structure by alliances 
No mergers M0 North: 1, 2, 3 South: 4, 5, 6 
One merger M1 North: 15, 2, 3 South: 4, 6 
Two mergers (or merger wave) M2 North: 15, 3 South: 42, 6 
 
 
Before the two-stage market competition, described in subsection 3.2, can take place, the carriers belonging to a 
certain alliance play a four-stage merger game with CD, involving the following sequence of actions (depicted also 
in the Figure 1): 
 
 In the first stage, North Alliance’s carrier 1 can merge with South Alliance’s carrier 5. If no mergers are 
proposed, the benchmark competition (labelled with M0 in Table 1) occurs; 
 
 In the second stage, depending on what was proposed in the first stage, CD decides whether to approve or 
block the project by considering its potential anti-competitive effects to the detriment of consumers, i.e., 
higher freight rates compared to pre-merger conditions (EU Commission, 2004, par. 8). At this stage, if CD 
does not approve the proposal, we assume that no other carriers will be able to submit different merger 
projects, and again the benchmark competition occurs, with structure M0. By contrast, if the merger 
proposed in the first stage is cleared by CD, the game moves to the following stage; 
 
 In the third stage, if a merger between carriers 1 and 5 has been previously approved, then South Alliance’s 
carrier 4 can react by merging with North Alliance’s carrier 2. At this stage, if such a merger is not proposed, 
the benchmark competition occurs (with structure labelled M1); 
 
 In the fourth stage of the game, CD decides whether to approve the merger between carriers 4 and 2, as 
proposed in the previous stage. In case of approval, the market structure would be M2, otherwise the 
market structure will be M1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Carrier 1 
CD 
M0 
Merger with 
Carrier 5 
No merger 
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Figure 1. Merger formation game 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4  Post-merger equilibrium analysis 
 
By backward induction we seek the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies of the above 
described four-stage merger formation game as follows. 
 
Analysis of the fourth stage of the game. Before comparing the freight rates corresponding to structures M1 and M2, 
to evaluate the impact of a potential merger wave on consumer surplus, we check whether this merger proposal 
would induce an alliance-preserving market structure or not. By making use of profits presented in Appendix A 
(derived as in the two-stage market game above), in the case of structure M2, π2,s3 = π2,s6 > 0; π1,s2 = π1,s3 > 0; and π1,s4 
= π1,s6 > 0 are satisfied for V/K > 7.25g. This means that, for V/K ≤ 7.25g, merger waves are assumed to be not 
feasible (as non-merging allied carriers would exit the market). Since f2s ≤ f1s only if V/K ≤ 9.06g, therefore, merger 
waves would be accepted by CD for V/K between 7.25g and 9.06g. 
 
Analysis of the third stage of the game. If the merger game reaches this stage, carriers 4 and 2 decide whether to 
propose a merger or not. In the former case, the two carriers would enjoy joint profits π2,s42, while in the latter they 
would earn π1,s4 and π1,s2, respectively. Making use of Appendix A, simple algebra shows that π2,s42 > π1,s4 + π1,s2 for 
V/K between 1.71g and 36.03g. By recalling the results in the above analysis, i.e. for values of V/K between 7.25g 
and 9.06g, merger waves are always profitable and thus proposed. 
 
Analysis of the second stage of the game. In the second stage, if carrier 1 has submitted a merger proposal with 
carrier 5, CD is called upon to review it. Here, we consider three sub-cases (derived from the previous analysis): (i) 
for V/K > 9.06g, CD correctly anticipates that, in this range, the market structure could be M1, as carriers 4 and 2 
would not propose a merger. However, since f1s ≤ fs only if V/K ≤ 7.44g, the  CD will not approve any merger 
submitted in the first stage and thus the market structure M0 prevails; (ii) for V/K between 7.25g and 9.06g, the 
expected market structure, M2, reflects a merger wave. Since f2s ≤ fs if V/K ≤ 8.25g, then, for V/K between 7.25g and 
8.25g, the CD approves a merger involving carrier 1 and 5 (inducing a merger wave), and blocks it otherwise; (iii) 
for V/K < 7.25g, the CD anticipates that π1,s2 = π1,s3 > 0 and π1,s4 = π1,s6 > 0 only for V/K > 6.3g. Therefore, a single 
merger is always approved, as f1s ≤ fs for V/K ≤ 7.44g. 
 
Analysis of the first stage of the game. In the first stage of the merger formation game, carrier 1 is given the chance 
to merge with carrier 5. Due to further concentrations reviewed in the successive stages, this choice would entail 
different (expected) final market structures. In this sense, carrier 1 compares the (joint) profits that merging 
carriers would gain in each situation with the benchmark scenario. By investigating the preferences over possible 
final market structures, we summarize carrier 1’s choice in the first stage as follows. For V/K > 8.25g, no merger is 
proposed, since the CD would not clear it (higher freight rates with any type of merger); for V/K between 7.25g and 
8.25g, the condition 2,s15 > πs1 + πs5 is satisfied for V/K < 77.20g, thus, in this range, the merger between carriers 1 
and 5 (followed by a merger wave) would be always proposed (and then cleared); (iii) for V/K between 6.3g and 
Block Approval 
M0 Carrier 4 
Merger with 
Carrier 2 
M1 
No merger 
CD 
Block Approval 
M1 M2 
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7.25g, a single merger (inducing the market structure M1) implies larger joint profits for merging carriers vis a  vis 
the benchmark scenario (i.e., π2,s15 > πs1 + πs5) as this is satisfied for V/K < 27.61g. This means that any merger is 
proposed (and successively approved); (iv) for V/K < 6.3g, carrier 1 is not allowed to propose any merger because 
alliances would break down anyway. 
  
As illustrated in Figure 2, we complete the post-merger equilibrium analysis and state the following: 
 
Proposition 2. (Post-merger equilibrium with vertical separation). In the presence of vertical separation of carriers 
and terminal operators in the container shipping industry, the merger formation game would induce the following 
market structures: 
 
 No merger (M0) for V/K > 8.25g 
 Two mergers (M2) for 7.25g < V/K < 8.25g 
 One merger (M1) for 6.3g < V/K < 7.25g 
 No merger (M0) for V/K < 6.3g 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
Proposition 2 highlights two important results. First, and as expected, mergers among carriers are more likely to 
take place in situations of increasing overcapacity. In recent years, as carriers’ excess supply has negatively affected 
freight rates, allied carriers mostly had the incentive to merge with other alliance members to soften price 
competition. From a normative perspective, as K increases, the parameter V/K decreases, thus merger waves are 
more likely to be approved (i.e., for V/K between 7.25g and 8.25g). The intuition behind this result is explained as 
follows. To clear mergers, the CD requires that the overall output (in terms of TEUs moved) would expand so as to 
lower freight rates. Thus, given a certain market size, overcapacity effects outweigh rising rates due to lower 
marginal revenues for merging carriers. Second, as discussed in Vasconcelos (2010), whenever Cournot mergers 
are cleared, follow-up concentrations must be cleared too. This fact, however, undermines alliance stability. In our 
case, a merger between carriers 1 and 5 (followed by a similar merger between carriers 4 and 2) would imply a 
larger overall quantity of TEUs being moved. 
 
 
4.  What is the impact of vertical integration on alliance stability? 
 
This section investigates the impact of vertical integration among carriers and terminal operators on their 
incentive to conclude mergers but also on alliance stability. By assuming linkages between sea and terminal 
operators, our main aim is to study the potential effects of this vertical integration on the outcomes of the merger 
review. Moreover, it would be interesting to identify the extent at what the occurrence of merger waves in the 
container shipping might channel to alliance stability. To do so, two cases are contrasted. In this first case, we 
assume that, either in the first or second round of mergers, carriers who have the chance to submit merger projects 
also own controlling stakes in terminals they call. According to this partial vertical integration case, individual 
allied non-merging carriers do not internalize terminal charges. In the second case, instead, we assume a full 
vertical integration of allied carriers and terminal operators, allowing for cost efficiencies that might extend from 
sea to terminal operations. 
 
 
4.1  Market competition with partial vertical integration 
 
This alternative scenario (labelled p) considers a more realistic setting where carriers controlling terminal 
operations are more likely to have financial resources to undertake mergers. Notable examples are recent 
takeovers in which vertically-integrated acquirers were dominant in their alliances and had more advantages over 
other allied carriers (e.g., CMA CGM, controlling Marsaxlokk in Malta, acquired NOL in 2016). In such merger cases, 
however, sharing agreements did not extend to terminal operations, with integrated carriers charging terminal 
tariffs to allied partners (Parola et al., 2014). 
 
Still, by applying the backward induction procedure, we first derive the carriers’ decision in the second stage of the 
market game. By taking terminal tariffs tpN and tpS as given, the vertically integrated carriers 1 and 4, together with 
their allied partners 2, 3 (North Alliance) and 5, 6 (South Alliance) choose own quantity of TEUs by solving the 
following respective maximization problem: 
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max
𝑞1
𝑝
{𝜋1
𝑝 = (𝑉/𝐾 − 𝑞1
𝑝 − ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑝3
𝑖≠1 − ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑝6
𝑗=4 − 3𝑔)𝑞1
𝑝 + 𝑡𝑁
𝑝(𝑞2
𝑝 + 𝑞3
𝑝)}     [16] 
 
max
𝑞
𝑖≠1
𝑝
{𝜋𝑖≠1
𝑝 = (𝑉/𝐾 − 𝑞𝑖≠1
𝑝 − ∑ 𝑞ℎ
𝑝3
ℎ≠𝑖 − ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑝6
𝑗=4 − 3𝑔 − 𝑡𝑁
𝑝)𝑞𝑖≠1
𝑝 }      [17] 
 
max
𝑞4
𝑝
{𝜋4
𝑝 = (𝑉/𝐾 − 𝑞4
𝑝 − ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑝6
𝑗≠4 − ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑝3
𝑖=1 − 3𝑔)𝑞4
𝑝 + 𝑡𝑆
𝑝(𝑞5
𝑝 + 𝑞6
𝑝)}     [18] 
 
max
𝑞
𝑗≠4
𝑝
{𝜋𝑗≠4
𝑝 = (𝑉/𝐾 − 𝑞𝑗≠4
𝑝 − ∑ 𝑞𝑙
𝑝6
𝑙≠𝑗 − ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑝3
𝑖=1 − 3𝑔 − 𝑡𝑆
𝑝)𝑞𝑗≠4
𝑝 }      [19] 
 
 
By solving the above system of best response equations (∂πp1/∂qp1 = 0, ∂πpi≠1/∂qpi≠1 = 0, ∂πp4/∂qp4 = 0, ∂πpj≠4/∂qpj≠4 
= 0), we again derive equilibrium of TEUs as a function of terminal charges: 
 
𝑞1
𝑝(𝑡𝑁
𝑝 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑝) =
1
7
(𝑉/𝐾 − 3𝑔 + 2𝑡𝑁
𝑝 + 2𝑡𝑆
𝑝)         [20] 
 
𝑞2
𝑝(𝑡𝑁
𝑝 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑝) = 𝑞3
𝑝(𝑡𝑁
𝑝 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑝) =
1
7
(𝑉/𝐾 − 3𝑔 − 5𝑡𝑁
𝑝 + 2𝑡𝑆
𝑝)       [21] 
 
𝑞4
𝑝(𝑡𝑁
𝑝 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑝) =
1
7
(𝑉/𝐾 − 3𝑔 + 2𝑡𝑁
𝑝 + 2𝑡𝑆
𝑝)         [22] 
 
𝑞5
𝑝(𝑡𝑁
𝑝 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑝) = 𝑞6
𝑝(𝑡𝑁
𝑝 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑝) =
1
7
(𝑉/𝐾 − 3𝑔 − 5𝑡𝑆
𝑝 + 2𝑡𝑁
𝑝)       [23] 
 
 
Differently from the case of vertical separation between carriers and terminal operators, the impact of terminal 
charges on integrated carriers (1 and 4) is different from that on non-integrated ones (carrier 2, 3, 5 and 6). Since 
integrated carriers internalize the reducing-effect of THCs on TEUs moved (as described in section 3.2), by 
increasing THCs they thus lower the output of non-integrated carriers, while, in turn, their supply increases. 
Formally: 
 
𝜕𝑞1
𝑝(𝑡𝑁
𝑝 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑝 ) 𝜕⁄ 𝑡𝑁
𝑝 = 𝜕𝑞4
𝑝(𝑡𝑁
𝑝 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑝 ) 𝜕⁄ 𝑡𝑆
𝑝 > 0
𝜕𝑞2
𝑝(𝑡𝑁
𝑝 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑝 ) 𝜕⁄ 𝑡𝑁
𝑝 = 𝜕𝑞3
𝑝(𝑡𝑁
𝑝 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑝 ) 𝜕⁄ 𝑡𝑁
𝑝 < 0
𝜕𝑞5
𝑝(𝑡𝑁
𝑝 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑝 ) 𝜕⁄ 𝑡𝑆
𝑝 = 𝜕𝑞6
𝑝(𝑡𝑁
𝑝 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑝 ) 𝜕⁄ 𝑡𝑆
𝑝 < 0
         [24] 
 
Turning now to the first stage of the market game, we insert the second-stage equilibrium TEUs, as in [20]-[23], 
into the vertically integrated carriers’ profits and maximize them with respect to related terminal charges as 
follows: 
 
max 
𝑡𝑁
𝑝
𝜋1
𝑝[𝑞𝑖
𝑝(𝑡𝑁
𝑝 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑝), 𝑞𝑗
𝑝(𝑡𝑁
𝑝 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑝)]          [25] 
 
max 
𝑡𝑆
𝑝
𝜋4
𝑝[𝑞𝑖
𝑝(𝑡𝑁
𝑝 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑝), 𝑞𝑗
𝑝(𝑡𝑁
𝑝 , 𝑡𝑆
𝑝)]          [26] 
 
By solving the related system of two best response functions (∂πp1/∂tpN = 0, ∂πp4/∂tpS = 0), we derive the THCs 
charged to respective allied partners, as follows: 
 
𝑡𝑁
𝑝 = 𝑡𝑆
𝑝 =
1
16
(𝑉/𝐾 − 3𝑔)           [27] 
 
By inserting [27] in [20]-[23], [1], and [16]-[19], we state the: 
 
Proposition 3 (Pre-merger equilibrium with partial vertical integration). In cases of partial vertical integration 
among carriers and terminal operators, vertically-integrated carriers move more TEUs and enjoy larger profits 
compared to non-integrated allied carriers. At equilibrium, individual TEUs, freight rates and carriers’ profits are as 
follows: 
    
𝑞1
𝑝 = 𝑞4
𝑝 =
1
4
(𝑉/𝐾 − 3𝑔)           [28] 
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𝑞2
𝑝 = 𝑞3
𝑝 = 𝑞5
𝑝 = 𝑞6
𝑝 =
1
16
(𝑉/𝐾 − 3𝑔)         [29] 
 
𝑓𝑝 =
1
4
(𝑉/𝐾 + 9𝑔)           [30] 
 
𝜋1
𝑝 = 𝜋4
𝑝 =
11
128
(𝑉/𝐾 − 3𝑔)2          [31] 
 
𝜋2
𝑝 = 𝜋3
𝑝 = 𝜋5
𝑝 = 𝜋6
𝑝 =
1
256
(𝑉/𝐾 − 3𝑔)2
         
[32]
  
 
 
With respect to the merger game involving vertically integrated merging carriers, again we go backward to derive 
the SPNE and state the following: 
 
Proposition 4 (Post-merger container shipping with partial vertical integration). In the case of partial vertical 
integration of carriers and terminal operators, the merger formation game would induce the following market 
structures: 
 
 No merger (M0) for V/K > 19.8g 
 Two mergers (M2) for 10.5g < V/K < 19.8g 
 One merger (M1) for 7.4g < V/K < 10.5g 
 No merger (M0) for V/K < 7.4g 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
In this scenario, Proposition 4 clearly demonstrates that the vertical integration of carriers and terminal operators 
may have a striking impact on post-wave container shipping. By comparing Figures 2 and 3, for increasing levels 
of excess capacity (parameter K goes up), vertical integration does increase the likelihood of merger approvals. 
More interestingly, consolidations involving more carriers (merger waves) are cleared by CA for V/K between 10.5g 
and 19.8g, that is, for a relatively lower overcapacity compared to the non-integration case. By recalling Proposition 
3, as internalized THCs allow vertically-integrated carriers to move more TEUs, two-round concentrations are 
cleared for a relatively less striking industry overcapacity (proofs of the proposition are available upon request 
from the authors). 
 
 
4.2  Market competition with full vertical integration 
 
In this section, further integration options are explored by assuming that terminal operations are completely 
shared among allied partners. More specifically, horizontal and vertical cooperation mix together in a competitive 
scenario where logistics and shipping systems are fully integrated. As noted above, although alliances include 
forms of cooperation at sea (slot chartering, vessel sharing), they usually tend to exclude terminal sharing to 
rationalize costs in port (Satta and Persico, 2015). In other words, whereas carriers share vessels on the main 
routes, instead, they are generally not prepared to share port facilities at their ports of call.4 The main reason is 
that, by requiring a high level of control over terminals in terms of handling costs and schedule reliability, 
vertically-integrated carriers are unwilling to share the residual capacity of their terminals to partners (Parola et 
al., 2015). 
 
In formal terms, by assuming vertical integration involving terminal operators and all the allied carriers, the 
market equilibrium can be simply derived by maximizing carriers’ profits with respect to the individual TEUs 
supplied (i.e., without recurring to the backward induction procedure). In this setting (labelled f), each carrier is 
vertically integrated and sets quantities of TEUs, qfi and qfj, such that: 
 
max
𝑞
𝑖
𝑓
{𝜋𝑖
𝑓 = (𝑉/𝐾 − 𝑞𝑖
𝑓 − ∑ 𝑞ℎ
𝑓3
ℎ≠𝑖 − ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑓6
𝑗=4 − 3𝑔)𝑞𝑖
𝑓}       [33] 
 
max
𝑞
𝑗
𝑓
{𝜋𝑗
𝑓 = (𝑉/𝐾 − 𝑞𝑗
𝑓 − ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑓3
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑞𝑙
𝑓6
𝑙≠𝑗 − 3𝑔)𝑞𝑗
𝑓}       [34] 
 
                                                 
4 A notable exception is the Maersk-Cosco terminal under construction at the Savona-Vado port in Italy. 
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It is here important to note that, whenever terminal sharing agreements involve integrated and non-integrated 
carriers, the supply of TEUs does not depend on terminal charges, now assumed to be internalized by all the allied 
carriers. By solving the related system of six equations and inserting equilibrium quantities of TEUs in [1] and [33]-
[34], the pre-merger equilibrium with full vertical integration is as follows: 
 
Proposition 5 (Pre-merger equilibrium with full vertical integration). In case of full vertical integration (terminal 
sharing) of carriers and terminal operators, at equilibrium, individual quantities, freight rates and carriers’ profits 
are given by: 
    
𝑞1
𝑓 = 𝑞2
𝑓 = ... = 𝑞6
𝑓 =
1
5
(𝑉/𝐾 − 3𝑔)         [35] 
 
𝑓𝑓 =
1
7
(𝑉/𝐾 + 6𝑔)           [36] 
 
𝜋1
𝑓 = 𝜋2
𝑓 = ...𝜋6
𝑓 =
1
49
(𝑉/𝐾 − 3𝑔)2         [37] 
 
 
With respect to the merger formation game, we obtain the SPNE of the game as in Figure 4. Hence, 
 
Proposition 6 (Post-merger equilibrium with full vertical integration). In the presence of full vertical integration 
(terminal sharing) of carriers and terminal operators in container shipping, the merger formation game would induce 
the following market structures: 
 
 No merger (M0) for V/K > 17g 
 One merger (M1) for 11g < V/K < 17g 
 Two mergers (M2) for 6g < V/K < 11g 
 No merger (M0) for V/K < 6g 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
By assuming both the vertical integration of carriers and terminal operators and the existence of terminal sharing 
agreements among allied carriers, the result in Proposition 6 theoretically puts forward the hypothesis for which 
extending cost savings to terminal operations might enable more merger waves to be approved. The outcome of 
the related merger game, as depicted in Figure 4, does support the above argument. Differently from what was 
observed in the previous scenario where terminal services are not shared among allied carriers, merger waves are 
sustainable (and approved) also for relatively higher levels of industry overcapacity. This result suggests that, in 
this case, the primary condition which stimulates horizontal mergers in container shipping (indeed, the 
overcapacity) could be compatible with the occurrence of merger waves among global carriers (proofs of the 
proposition are available from the authors upon request).  
 
 
5.  DISCUSSION 
 
Relevant post-merger market outcomes associated to different types of vertical integration of carriers and terminal 
operators are summarized in Table 2. Our analysis started with a scenario in which carriers and terminal operators 
are separated. Although this occurs only in relatively small ports where big liner companies have not invested in 
terminals, we considered it as a benchmark setting to tackle the impact of vertical integration on the post-merger 
stability of alliances. 
 
 
Range of V/K Vertical separation Partial vertical integration Full vertical integration 
(3g, 6g) 
No merger 
No merger 
No merger 
[6g, 6.3g) 
Merger wave [6.3g, 7.25g) One merger 
[7.25g, 7.4g) Merger wave 
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[7.4g, 8.25g) 
One merger 
[8.25g, 10.5g) 
No merger 
[10.5g, 11g) 
Merger wave [11g, 17g) One merger 
[17g, 19.8g) 
No merger 
[19.8g, ∞) No merger 
 
Table 2. Merger control games outcomes with different vertical integration 
 
 
Overall, we have argued that the withdrawal of target carriers from their respective alliances (because of merger 
control review) would inevitably weaken alliances. This, because non-merging allied carriers might realize low 
profits and financial distress (the bankruptcy of Hanjin in 2016 is a case in point here). In case of vertical separation 
of carriers and terminal operators, for relatively low levels of overcapacity with respect to marginal costs at sea 
(i.e., V/K between 3g and 6.3g), no alliance-preserving mergers are feasible. For V/K between 6.3g and 7.25g, only 
single mergers (labelled M1) are finalized. In those two cases, merger waves would force non-merging carriers out 
of the market. Instead, for V/K between 7.25g and 8.25g merger waves are allowed as they could be beneficial to 
consumers. In other words, increasing levels of overcapacity would trigger sequential consolidations as non-
merging carriers are more likely to gain less profits (they have also to pay terminal charges to landside operators).  
 
What happens, however, when merging carriers are linked to terminal operators (through controlling stakes)? As 
seen in Table 2, when considering a more real-life scenario, in which major carriers are both vertically-integrated 
at ports and can acquire other carriers (e.g., Maersk, CMA CGM, Cosco, Hapag Lloyd), the scope for consolidation is 
heightened: for V/K between 7.4g and 19.8g, at least one merger is finalized. However, when restricting attention 
to merger waves only, the partial vertical integration is compatible only for V/K above 10.5g; this suggests a rather 
restrictive scenario when dealing with the stability of alliances. When the levels of relative overcapacity are instead 
between 3g and 7.4g, any merger project would imply negative profits for allied non-merging carriers and thus the 
alliances’ breakdown. Since vertically-integrated carriers are assumed to be acquirers in merger proposals (as 
supported by evidence in the industry), non-merging carriers are indeed more likely to exit the market with respect 
to the vertical separation case. Therefore, in this scenario, the occurrence of merger waves overall reduces alliance 
stability. 
 
Finally, the hypothesis of full vertical integration gave remarkable results, as the resulting sequence of 
concentrations does not necessarily induce alliances to be reshaped post-merger. In fact, full terminal sharing 
agreements among allied carriers mean that even non-merging carriers do not pay terminal charges and they can 
thus enlarge own supply accordingly. Therefore, in the presence of larger industry overcapacity over marginal costs 
(i.e., for V/K between 6g and 11g), non-merging (but now vertically-integrated) allied carriers have enough 
capacity to realize a profit.5 As it is more difficult for carriers to incur post-merger losses, alliances are likely to 
survive also in situations where merger waves occur. 
 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper contributes in explaining how horizontal merger waves influence the stability of alliances in the 
container shipping industry, considering also the circumstances in which carriers and terminal operators are 
vertically integrated. Whenever overcapacity in container shipping leads to consolidation among carriers, we find 
that resulting merger waves may weaken alliances and lead to their reshaping. Using non-cooperative merger 
formation games, we find that, in a Cournot framework (i.e., carriers compete by supplying TEUs), should financial 
conditions worsen due to chronic overcapacity, the likelihood of merger waves – together with the existing 
normative approach in the merger control review – is correlated with the reshaping of alliances. By analyzing 
recent EU merger cases in container shipping, we observe that merger proposals are preferably approved subject 
to the withdrawal of selected merging parties from their own alliance. In turn, non-merging allied carriers might 
have the incentive to seek similar mergers with liner companies belonging to other alliances to rationalize costs as 
                                                 
5  Notice that, given that slight demand shocks are not able to make overall TEUs expand to offset rising sea freight rates, then, 
in the region for which V/K is between 11g and 17g, single mergers are welfare-preferable and thus approved. 
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well. Cases in point in 2016 were APL/NOL leaving G6 when merging with CMA CGM (O3), or UASC abandoning 
NEU1/O3 consortium to join Hapag-Lloyd (G6). In such cases, alliance stability might be undermined by the fact 
that capacity-wise distressed alliances are deprived of members, with remaining carriers unable to make profit. 
This effect could explain the reshaping of alliances we have witnessed in the last two years, where four alliances 
(2M, G6, O3 and CKYHE) were replaced by three coalitions (2M, Ocean Alliance and THE Alliance). 
 
We have seen that the emergence of vertical integration between carriers and terminal operators raises questions 
on the effect of this on the stability of post-wave alliances. To address this specific issue, we expanded our merger 
formation set-up by contrasting two real-life cases. In the first, by assuming vertically-integrated carriers not 
willing to share terminal facilities with allied members, we show that merger waves might make alliances unstable. 
When internalizing terminal charges, however, merging carriers enlarge their supply in terms of TEUs not only due 
to the approved concentration but also because of the vertical integration. This effect will further stimulate follow-
up mergers, to the point where carriers belonging to a certain alliance exit the market and, as as result, alliances 
must reshape. In the second case, yet we argued that a full integration among all allied partners and terminal 
operators could instead make alliances more stable. By allowing for vertically-integrated carriers willing to share 
terminal assets with non-merging allied partners (de facto, terminal charges are ruled out), very large levels of 
overcapacity may indeed stimulate merger waves but, at the same time, these are not likely to cause the breakdown 
of alliances in the short run. Since non-merging allied partners might also benefit from reduced costs in port, they 
have a larger probability to yield post-merger profits. As a result, as the current integration among sea and terminal 
operators seems to be unavoidable due the continuous cost-saving strive of carriers, we argue that if such form of 
vertical cooperation is alliance-based (that is, all the partners share terminal facilities), merger waves are more 
sustainable, without necessarily inducing the breakdown of alliances. 
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APPENDIX    
 
A. Post-merger equilibrium w/vertical separation (freight rates, profits and terminal charges) 
 
 M1 M2 
f 𝑓𝑠
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1
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(5𝑉/𝐾 +
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3
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4
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[5𝑉/𝐾 + 29𝑔]2        
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(4𝑉/𝐾 + 11𝑔)2    
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2,𝑠 = 𝑡𝑆
2,𝑠 =
1
4
(𝑉/𝐾 −
9
4
𝑔) 
 
B.1 Post-merger equilibrium w/partial integration (sea freight rates, profits and terminal charges) 
 
 M1 M2 
f 𝑓𝑝
1 =
1
202
(55𝑉/𝐾 + 401𝑔) 𝑓𝑝
2 =
1
31
(9𝑉/𝐾 + 45𝑔) 
π 
𝜋15
1,𝑝 3993
40804
(𝑉/𝐾)2 +
9559
20402
𝑔𝑉/𝐾 +
36485
40804
𝑔2 
𝜋2
1,𝑝 = 𝜋3
1,𝑝 =
1
40804
(11(𝑉/𝐾) − 41𝑔)2
𝜋4
1,𝑝 =
145
40804
(5𝑉/𝐾 − 37𝑔)2
𝜋6
1,𝑝 =
9
40804
(5𝑉/𝐾 − 37𝑔)2
 
𝜋15
2,𝑝 = 𝜋42
2,𝑝 =
95
961
(𝑉/𝐾)2 −
228
961
𝑔𝑉/𝐾 +
2277
3844
𝑔2 
 
𝜋3
2,𝑝 = 𝜋6
2,𝑝 =
1
961
(2𝑉/𝐾 − 21𝑔)2 
t 
𝑡𝑁
1,𝑝 =
1
101
(22𝑉/𝐾 + 19𝑔)
𝑡𝑆
1,𝑝 =
1
101
(20𝑉/𝐾 − 148𝑔)
 𝑡𝑁
2,𝑝 = 𝑡𝑆
2,𝑝 =
1
31
(7𝑉/𝐾 − 27𝑔) 
 
 
 
 
C.1 Post-merger equilibrium w/full integration (sea freight rates and profits) 
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Figure 2. Post-merger equilibrium (vertical separation) 
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Figure 3. Post-merger equilibrium (partial integration) 
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